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 Cristina Bicchieri
 REDUCTIONIST STRATEGIES
 A longstanding tradition in the social sciences contrasts instrumental
 rationality and social norms as alternative ways of explaining action.
 Rational choice theory defines action as the outcome of a practical inference
 that takes preferences and beliefs as premises. An explanation in terms
 of norms depicts a socialized actor whose behavior is not outcome oriented,
 since when acting in accordance with a norm one does not engage in a
 rational calculation nor does one pay very much attention to the con-
 sequences. Attempts at bridging the gap have either tried to establish
 that social norms are rational, in the sense of being efficient means to
 achieve individual or social welfare, or that it is rational to conform to
 norms, thus reducing compliance to utility maximization.
 The first reductionist strategy makes a typical post hoc, ergo propter
 hoc fallacy, since the mere presence of a social norm does not justify
 inferring that it is there to accomplish some social function. Besides, it
 does not account for the fact that many social norms are inefficient, as
 in the case of discriminatory norms against women and blacks, or are so
 rigid as to prevent the fine-tuning that would be necessary to successfully
 accommodate new cases. Even if a norm is a means to achieve a social
 end, such as cooperation, retribution, or fairness, usually it is not the
 sole means. Many social norms are underdetermined with respect to the
 collective objectives they may serve, nor can they be ordered according
 to a criterion of greater or lesser efficiency in meeting these goals. Such
 an ordering would be feasible only if it were possible to show that one
 norm among others is the best means to attain a given social objective.
 Often, though, the objectives themselves are defined by means of some
 norm.
 Consider as an example norms of revenge; until not long ago, a
 Sicilian man who "dishonored" another man's daughter or sister had to
 make amends for the wrong by marrying the woman or pay for his
 rashness with his own life. The objective was to restore the family's lost
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 honor, but the social norms dictating the ways in which this could be
 done were the only means available to identify honor in those circumstances.
 One may think that some form of monetary compensation would have
 worked equally well, if not better, in the case in which a marriage was
 impossible. It would have spared one, perhaps many, lives. But accepting
 a monetary compensation was not revenge, and since nobody would have
 ever accepted such an atonement, nobody would have even thought of
 offering it. Approving of the man who exacts revenge, calling him a
 "man of honor," does not necessarily involve approval of the norm as
 rational or efficient. Even if one thinks a norm unjust and useless, it may
 be difficult not to conform, since violation involves a collective action
 problem: nobody wants to be the first to risk social disapproval by breaking
 the norm openly. That is why people will often break a norm in private
 but still pay lip service to it in public.
 The second reductionist strategy argues that-provided that con-
 formity to a norm attracts approval and transgression, disapproval-
 conforming is the rational thing to do, since nobody willfully attracts
 discredit and punishment. If others' approval and disapproval act as
 external sanctions, we again have a cost-benefit argument. When there
 is nobody around to watch what we do and we still conform to the
 norm-the argument goes-it is because we have internalized these
 positive and negative sanctions. Yet to maintain that we conform to social
 norms because of the disapproval involved in violating them is of little
 help in explaining why norms are there, how they emerged, and why
 they persist. To say that one conforms because of the negative sanctions
 involved in nonconformity does not distinguish norm-abiding behavior
 from an obsession, in which one feels an inner constraint to repeat the
 same action in order to quiet some "bad" thought, or from an entrenched
 habit that cannot be shed without great uneasiness. Nor does it distinguish
 norms from hypothetical imperatives enforced by sanctions, such as the
 rule that prohibits smoking in public areas. In all these cases, avoidance
 of the sanctions involved in transgression constitutes a decisive reason
 to conform, independently of what others do.
 The line of argument I wish to pursue is biased in favor of a different
 kind of reduction. Making norms rational, or making it unconditionally
 rational to conform to a norm, takes norms for granted. Asking why
 social norms are there, or why we tend to conform to them, does not
 shed any light on the norm formation process, since how norms emerge
 is a different story from why they emerge and become stable. The thesis
 I wish to sustain is that social norms are the outcome of learning in a
 strategic interaction context; hence, they are a function of individual
 choices and, ultimately, of individual preferences and beliefs. The view
 that norms are reducible to the preferences and beliefs of those who
 follow them is not new. David Lewis and Edna Ullmann-Margalit have
 proposed a game-theoretic account of norms and conventions according
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 to which a norm is broadly defined as an equilibrium.' The conventional
 game-theoretic account has serious limits, though. For one, it is a static
 description of norms as clusters of self-fulfilling expectations; it cannot
 explain, nor was it meant to, how expectations come to be self-fulfilling.
 The equilibrium account of norms must be supplemented with a story
 of how interacting agents learn to recognize a behavioral pattern, how
 they settle upon a stable pattern, and what sort of behavior is more likely
 to be sustainable.
 Learning a behavioral pattern must not be confused with socialization,
 the process through which the newcomer comes to accept an established
 group's norm. Since our subject is the development of new norms in
 a group, learning cannot be separated from emergence. The size of
 the group matters, though. If learning can easily occur in two-person
 interactions, it may be impossible in a large population, where all that
 one observes is aggregate behavior. Norms may emerge through learning
 in a small group and subsequently spread to a large population by some
 other mechanism. In the last section of the article, I propose an evolutionary
 account of the propagation of norms from small groups to large pop-
 ulations.
 Finally, an analysis of emergence, as opposed to one stressing the
 functions fulfilled by social norms, may shed light upon the differences
 between social norms and other types of regularities, such as hypothetical
 imperatives, moral codes, or legal norms as well as upon those char-
 acteristics which are common to all social norms, however different
 they might be.
 EQUILIBRIUM
 Norms serve to guide an individual's behavior but also to allow an individual
 to anticipate others' behavior. We expect people to conform to norms
 and expect others to expect us to conform, too. A social norm is, in a
 way, a cluster of expectations. Expectations, I want to argue, play a crucial
 role in sustaining a norm. Indeed, conformity to a social norm is not
 unconditional; it is, rather, a conditional choice based on expectations
 about other people's behavior and beliefs. One's interest in avoiding the
 negative consequences of transgression, as well as the feelings of shame
 and guilt that may accompany it, reinforce one's tendency to conform.
 But they are not the sole, nor the ultimate, determinants of conformity.
 Reducing conformity to unconditional utility maximization overlooks the
 conditional element which characterizes norm-abiding behavior. Besides,
 approval and disapproval are sanctions that presuppose the existence of
 norms that everyone expects to be followed. Consider a community that
 abides by a strict norm of truth telling. A foreigner that, upon entering
 1. D. Lewis, Convention (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969); E. Ullmann-
 Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).
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 the community, systematically violates this norm will be met with hostility,
 if not utterly excluded from the group. But suppose a large group of
 liars makes its way into this small society. Probably the truth-telling norm
 would cease to exist, since the strength of a norm lies in its being followed
 by almost all of the participants.
 It may seem that most people's experience of conformity to a norm
 is beyond rational calculation. Compliance may look like a habit, thoughtless
 and automatic, or it may be driven by feelings of anxiety at the thought
 of what would happen if one transgresses the norm. Yet conformity to
 a norm may be rational and may be explained in terms of one's beliefs
 and desires, even though one does not conform out of a rational calculation.
 As David Lewis himself pointed out in his analysis of habits, a habit may
 be under an agent's rational control in the sense that should that habit
 ever cease to serve the agent's desires according to his beliefs, it would
 at once be overridden and abandoned.2 Similarly, an explanation in terms
 of norms does not compete with one in terms of expectations and pref-
 erences, since a norm persists precisely because of certain expectations
 and preferences: if I ever wanted to be different, or if I expected others
 to do something different, I would probably overcome the force of the
 norm.
 One is not constantly aware of one's preferences and desires, which
 are better described as dispositions to act in a certain way in certain
 circumstances. What is required is that such motives be ready to manifest
 themselves in the relevant circumstances. If somebody were to ask you
 now if you prefer a Caribbean holiday and five thousand dollars to a
 punch in the nose and ten thousand dollars, I do not know what your
 answer would be. Whatever option you would choose, it is likely that you
 would never have thought of it before; you would not know, for example,
 that you preferred the Caribbean holiday and five thousand dollars until
 you were put in the condition to choose. Analogously, when conforming
 to a norm, one may be unaware of the expectations and preferences that
 underlie one's behavior and which become manifest only when they
 happen to be unfulfilled.
 What sort of preferences and expectations underlie the conditional
 choice to conform? A norm is there because everyone expects everyone
 else to conform, and everyone knows he is expected to conform, too,
 but expectations alone cannot motivate a choice. If my compliance is
 grounded on the expectation of almost universal compliance, it must be
 that I prefer to comply with the norm on condition that almost everyone
 else complies, too. When going to a dinner party, I do not wear sneakers,
 not simply because I expect everybody to wear proper shoes but because
 I also prefer to wear proper shoes if everybody else does. Note that I do
 2. D. Lewis, "Languages and Language," in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
 ed. K. Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975), vol. 3, p. 25. See
 also "Convention: Reply to Jamieson," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1975): 113-20.
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 not need to assume that the other guests at the dinner party also have
 conditional preferences. My belief that they will wear proper shoes may
 be grounded on the idea that they actively dislike sneakers or that perhaps
 they are very traditional and not given to casual dressing. Of course, I
 might fear that disappointing their expectations will bring about contempt
 and thus have some additional good reason to wear proper shoes. But
 this is an independent, secondary reason.
 More generally, a social norm (N) in a population (P) can be defined
 as a function of the beliefs and preferences of the members of P if the
 following conditions hold:
 1. Almost every member of P prefers to conform to N on the
 condition that almost everyone else conforms, too.3
 2. Almost every member of P believes that almost every other
 member of P conforms to N.
 Conditions 1 and 2 define a social norm as sustained by the beliefs
 and preferences of those who conform to it; they tell us that a social
 norm is an equilibrium in the game-theoretic sense of being a combination
 of strategies, one for each individual, such that each individual's strategy
 is a best reply to the others' strategies, were the others' strategies taken
 as given. Each maximizes his expected utility by conforming, on the
 condition that nearly everybody else conforms to the norm. Note that
 conditional preference indicates that conformity is not a dominant strategy;
 if it were, then one would have a reason to conform independently of
 what other people were expected to do, in which case the equilibrium
 would not be called a social norm.
 A norm is an equilibrium that is supported by a configuration of
 self-fulfilling expectations: if almost everybody expects most members
 of P to conform, then almost everybody will conform, given conditional
 preference for conformity. Jon Elster has argued that the distinction
 between rational, outcome-oriented behavior and behavior guided by
 social norms can be upheld by comparing the expectations that accompany
 norms with those characterizing strategic interaction. In the latter case,
 ''expectations can be derived endogenously from the assumption of rational
 actors," whereas the expectations involved in social norms are given prior
 to the interaction.4
 There are relatively few cases in which one can infer what actors
 will do from the assumption that they are rational. One such case is that
 of zero-sum games, in which a player's optimal choice against a rational
 opponent is a maximin mixed strategy. Another case is a game in which
 one or more players have a dominant strategy. In both situations ex-
 3. For a social norm to exist, it is not necessary to have universal conformity. On this
 point, see Lewis, Convention, p. 97.
 4. See J. Elster, "Rationality and Social Norms" (University of Chicago, 1987, mim-
 eographed), pp. 15-16.
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 pectations can be endogenously derived, provided it is common knowledge
 that the players are rational. My view is that neither zero-sum games nor
 games in which there are dominant strategies are suitable models for the
 emergence of norms.
 It is unlikely that norms would emerge out of situations of pure
 conflict. As Ullmann-Margalit has persuasively argued, even when social
 norms contribute to maintain a status quo which discriminates in favor
 of one of the parties, some bargaining occurs. Interests are not diametrically
 opposed in that the coercing party needs the other's cooperation to
 achieve his aims: he can threaten a sanction or promise a benefit and is
 liable to be punished if he does not stick to his part of the bargain.5
 The case of dominant strategies is quite different. Here at least one
 player's choice is independent of any expectation he may have, which
 makes his preference for a given course of action unconditional. Consider
 the following game:
 Game 1
 Player 2
 Left Right
 Top 2, 2 1, 3
 Player 1
 Bottom 1, 5 0, 1
 Here player 1 has a dominant strategy, which is to play Top. Note
 that 1 does not need to have any expectation about player 2's choice,
 since by playing Top he is always better off, whatever 2 does. His preference
 for Top is unconditional, as is his rational choice of it. Player 2 instead
 has no dominant strategy; hence, he has to guess 1's choice in order to
 make his. Knowing (or believing) that 1 is rational, he can predict that
 Top will be chosen; hence, he chooses to play Right. Player 2's preference
 for Right is conditional upon l's choosing Top, as his choice of Right is
 rational only with respect to his expectation of l's play. In this case,
 player 2's expectations can be endogenously derived by simply assuming
 player l's rationality.
 Since social norms involve conditional preferences, the presence
 of dominant strategies would violate condition 1. One would conform
 irrespective of what others do, but then it would become impossible
 to distinguish a norm from a habit or a moral imperative. We must
 conclude that an equilibrium characterization of norms must always
 take expectations as given, as the conditions under which they can be
 endogenously inferred from a rationality assumption do not obtain.
 Here is a different example:
 5. Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms, chap. 10.
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 Game 2
 Player 2
 L R
 T 2, 1 0,0
 Player 1
 B 0,0 1,2
 The game has two pure-strategy equilibria, Top Left and Bottom
 Right, and each is preferred to the other by one of the players. Because
 there are no dominant strategies, the assumption that players are rational
 does not suffice to make a choice. Each player has to guess what the
 other will do, but what each will do is a function of what he believes the
 other will do, leading to an infinite regress of expectations. Player 1
 prefers Top in case player 2 plays Left, but if he expects 2 to play Right,
 it is better for him to play Bottom. Similar reasoning applies to player
 2. Each has conditional preferences and makes a conditional choice,
 which is rational only insofar as it is consistent with the expectations he
 holds.
 Suppose game 2 represents the well-known telephone game: two
 people are talking over the phone but the connection is bad and the
 conversation gets interrupted. There are two possible ways to continue
 the communication: either the one who called first calls again or they
 take turns in calling. If player 1 called first, taking turns is best for him
 (2, 1), whereas his calling again is best for player 2 (1, 2). Each equilibrium
 represents a different norm, upheld by a different set of expectations.
 If the two players happen to share the same expectations, they also share
 the same norm.
 It may turn out that one equilibrium is more conspicuous than the
 other to the players. For example, one of the two parties may be much
 older than the other, and the society in which they live might have great
 regard for seniority. Then it would be tacitly assumed that the younger
 party calls first. One can imagine many other criteria, each of which
 identifies an equilibrium as a focal point in Schelling's sense.6 But even
 assuming that no conflict arises over which criterion of choice is appropriate
 to the case, the existence of focal points begs the question. For a focal
 point to exist, it must be common knowledge among the players that
 they describe the game in the same way, but unless it is explicitly assumed,
 there is no reason to believe that common knowledge exists. If, instead,
 common knowledge is assumed, the focal point equilibrium as well as
 the expectations that support it are exogenous to the game; but then a
 significant part of the coordination problem has been assumed away.
 What stands in need of explanation is precisely how and whether common
 knowledge can be achieved and focal points can become such.
 6. See T. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press, 1960).
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 We have specified the contingencies such that they favor Elster's
 claim that social norms involve exogenous expectations but not his claim
 that this is the characteristic that differentiates norm-guided behavior
 from strategic behavior. Conditions 1 and 2 reconcile norms with strategic
 behavior, but at a price: characterizing social norms as equilibria spells
 out the conditions under which norms can be upheld but does not indicate
 how these conditions can be realized. Since social norms are standards
 of behavior which have come to be expected by a community in a particular
 social setting, to describe how expectations become self-fulfilling is part
 of an explanation of how norms emerge.
 NORMS OF COOPERATION
 The class of norms I wish to discuss is that of norms of cooperation.
 These norms play an important role in collective action situations, which
 are closely related to the n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. In such games,
 each player has a dominant strategy and rationality dictates choosing it,
 irrespective of what one expects other players to choose. Specifically,
 each person can choose whether or not to cooperate, and there is no
 external authority to enforce sanctions on the defectors. Defection is thus
 costless, whereas cooperation is costly. Typical examples include voting,
 polluting, littering, saving electricity during a hot summer, and supporting
 public causes. In all of these cases, the benefits of cooperation depend
 upon the number of cooperators. In many of them, this number need
 not be the totality of those concerned. If enough people vote, refrain
 from consuming electricity, or support a public cause, all will benefit
 from the outcome. But those who did not register, kept their air conditioners
 at full power, or stayed home instead of going around collecting signatures
 will benefit even more, since they cannot be excluded from enjoying the
 product of the collective effort of others, while they did not pay any
 price to start with. In cases such as littering or polluting, where a small
 number of defectors is enough to do the damage, nearly universal co-
 operation is needed for the socially desirable outcome to obtain. It is
 enough that a few people start throwing garbage on a clean beach to
 induce newcomers to imitate them, since walking to a distant trash can
 seems futile when the beach is already spoiled. In each case, cooperation
 involves the risk of a net loss: if too many people defect, those who
 cooperate pay the cost and reap no benefit.
 Rational, self-interested individuals should therefore always defect,
 even if the collective outcome from joint defection is not Pareto optimal.
 It would be better for everybody to cooperate, but since cooperation is
 a dominated strategy, any agreement to cooperate would fail to be self-
 enforcing, as each player would have an incentive to cheat on the other.
 Then what stands in need of explanation is the fact that Prisoner's-
 Dilemma-like situations often do not result in disastrous outcomes; instead
 we observe that-overall-people tend to cooperate. There are occasions
 in which cooperative behavior is compatible with rationality. When the
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 cooperator/defector is not anonymous, cooperation may be expected
 even in the absence of external sanctions, since it may be in the individual's
 interest to form a reputation for being a cooperative type. If one lives
 in a small community, it may turn out that it is better to return the favors
 one receives, to pay one's debts, and in general to avoid exploiting one's
 neighbors, since once one has a reputation for being an untrustworthy
 person, he will never again receive help and will possibly be cheated by
 the rest of the group. Being cooperative in this case is a form of "global
 maximization," in that one is prepared to forgo a gain now for a greater
 future benefit.7
 Defection should be expected in all those circumstances in which an
 individual is anonymous, as is the case with large groups such as the
 firms in a competitive industry or the shareholders of a company. Defection
 should also occur in small groups, either when it is known that the group
 will dissolve on a given future date or when some member of the group
 plans to leave for good. Similarly, if the members of a community believe
 that it is coming to an end, the belief, however ungrounded, may be self-
 fulfilling, in that all sorts of defections will be rationally justified.
 Interactions that have a well-defined time limit can be represented
 as finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma games in which the players know
 both the structure of the game and their respective rationalities (in fact,
 they need to have k-level iterated knowledge of both, where k depends
 on the length of the game).8 In such games, the unique solution is to
 defect. This conclusion is obtained by working backward from the last
 play. In the last play, what happened before is strategically irrelevant
 and there is no future. Hence, the dominant strategy is to defect. At the
 penultimate stage, the players can infer from what they know about the
 game and each other what will happen in the last stage. They know that
 what they choose now will have no effect on their choices at the last stage
 and therefore choose to defect at the penultimate stage, too. This reasoning
 leads them to defect at each stage of the finitely repeated game.
 When cooperation occurs, it might be due neither to a change in
 preferences nor to the fact that people commit themselves to nonex-
 ploitative behavior. The fact that one's exploitative behavior is likely to
 be detected and sanctioned by future ostracism is a powerful deterrent,
 but these interactions have a known time limit. Cooperation becomes
 less surprising if we think that rationality, far from being a specific, clear-
 cut mode of action, is an inference to the best choice, given the beliefs
 7. See J. Elster, Ulysses and the Syrens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
 chap. 1.
 8. See C. Bicchieri, "Backward Induction without Common Knowledge," in Proceedings
 of the Philosophy of Science Association Meeting (1988), vol. 2, and "Self-Refuting Theories of
 Strategic Interaction: A Paradox of Common Knowledge," Erkenntnis 30 (1989): 69-85.
 Compare also P. Pettit and R. Sugden, "The Backward Induction Paradox," Journal of
 Philosophy 4 (1989): 1-14.
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 we have about the circumstances of play. For example, cooperation can
 result when the players have slight doubts about each other's rationality.9
 Suppose one player suspects the other to be "irrational" and to play,
 say, a tit-for-tat strategy, with some small probability ? > 0. If the suspected
 player knows it, she has an interest in confirming the suspicion by avoiding
 all moves that will reveal that she is rational. Thus she will not respond
 to defection with cooperation nor will she fail to cooperate following a
 cooperative move of the other player. Playing "as if" she were a tit-for-
 tat player, she hopes to induce the opponent to respond "kindly." In this
 case it is possible to cooperate for a long stretch, the total number of
 noncooperative plays being bounded above by a number which depends
 on E. The same result obtains if each player is rational and knows that
 the other is rational but neither knows that the other knows that he is
 rational. Then nobody is cheated but everybody has an interest in acting
 as if he were.
 A cooperative equilibrium is supported by a configuration of ex-
 pectations that makes it rational to choose a cooperative pattern of play.
 Reason does not favor one course of action over another, irrespective of
 players' expectations, so if one player expects the other to be less than
 fully rational, cooperation might ensue. Tit for tat, however, is only one
 of many possible cooperative patterns of play. For example, in a Prisoner's
 Dilemma game repeated fifty times, player 1 may decide to cooperate
 (C) in the first round, and for the next rounds n = 2, . .. , t < 50 to
 choose C in period n unless player 2 chose to defect (D) in period n -
 1. For rounds n > t, he will always defect, regardless of the other player's
 choice. Were player 2 to play D in period n - 1, player 1 will respond
 with D in period n. He may keep playing D until player 2 chooses C and
 then play C again. However, he may signal to player 2 his willingness to
 cooperate by returning to play C immediately after he played D in the
 previous round. Or they may alternate in playing C and D. In general,
 since a cooperative pattern is better for both, there will be several co-
 operative equilibria.
 With multiple equilibria, it may be impossible to predict which one
 will in fact be attained or whether one will be achieved at all by the
 players. Since cooperative behavior makes sense only under conditions
 of uncertainty about the other player's type, a cooperative equilibrium
 presumes that the players make the "right" probability assessments about
 each other's type. This consideration is particularly relevant since in real
 life one has to convince the opponent that one is likely to be a tit-for-
 tat player, while in these games the probability that a player is tit for tat
 is given and assumed to be common knowledge among the players.
 Conventional game theory gives no plausible description of how individuals'
 9. See D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson, "Rational Cooperation in the
 Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,"Journal of Economic Theory 27 (1982): 245-52.
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 beliefs come to converge, which calls for an understanding of belief
 formation and evolution.
 Usually when we witness "spontaneous" cooperative behavior, we
 tend to credit it to the existence of norms. Different patterns of cooperation
 are made to correspond to different norms of cooperation, which can
 be theoretically represented as focal-point equilibria of Prisoner's-Dilemma-
 type games. Here, too, the question arises as to how a population playing
 a given game over and over converges to some stationary equilibrium
 pattern of play. Unless one takes these norms as primitive, thus falling
 back into some form of equilibrium reasoning, it remains to be shown
 how the norms get established and what sort of mechanisms support
 them.
 The equilibrium definition of norms we have provided does not
 make any distinction between a norm that is followed by relatively few
 people and a norm that is shared by an entire population. Examples of
 the first are all those regular patterns of behavior that evolve in families,
 among friends, or in small, cohesive groups such as clubs and teams.
 The second type of norm is best illustrated by traffic rules, norms of
 etiquette, and all forms of racial or sexual discrimination. These latter
 are norms of cooperation, since they allow a large group, sometimes an
 entire population, to benefit from excluding some other group from
 certain activities or goods. What distinguishes the two types of norms is
 the process through which they come into existence. In both cases, in-
 dividuals will form some beliefs about other individuals, and if enough
 individuals share the same beliefs, they will act in a way that will make
 their beliefs self-fulfilling. In both cases individuals will learn to detect
 behavioral patterns, but the process of learning will differ according to
 the size of the group. Even in the absence of communication, in a two-
 person repeated interaction there is scope for signaling and for exper-
 imenting with different actions. In large groups, instead, one's actions
 go mostly undetected and all that one observes is the aggregate behavior
 of the group, which is the sole predictor of future outcomes. The indi-
 vidual's influence on the group is marginal, so there is no point in signaling
 or experimenting.
 Although a norm may emerge through learning in a two-person
 interaction, it may never spread to a population, and if it does, the
 mechanism accounting for its diffusion is likely to be very different from
 that which explains its formation. Size will not matter much in those
 cases in which the passage from few to many individuals does not involve
 a change of incentives. To illustrate this point, take the case of neighborhood
 segregation: a white family may prefer to stay in a certain neighborhood
 as long as other white families stay, so that if everybody expects others
 to stay, there will be no incentive to leave. When a black family moves
 in, the immediate neighbors may take it as a sign that further changes
 in the racial balance will follow. This fear may induce them to move,
 thereby generating further worries in their immediate neighbors, who
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 may also decide to relocate. This "snowball" effect is an example of
 spontaneous coordination: it takes the action of one or two individuals
 (families, in this case) to generate a collective outcome involving an entire
 population. The norm "do not live in a racially mixed neighborhood" is
 an example of a pattern of behavior that, once established among a few
 individuals, rapidly spreads to larger numbers through a mechanism of
 self-fulfilling expectations. Moreover, the greater the number of people
 who move away, the stronger becomes the incentive to move. With norms
 of cooperation, instead, the incentives to follow the norm are inversely
 proportional to the number of people involved. This is why it is so difficult
 to specify a plausible process of norm formation, especially in those cases
 in which a norm of reciprocity is shared by an entire population.
 LEARNING TO COOPERATE
 Imagine two individuals engaged in a Prisoner's-Dilemma-type game
 which they know will be repeated a finite number of times. They do not
 know each other nor do they have previous experience with this situation.
 These people are rational and know that joint cooperation is better than
 joint defection, but each has no idea of what sort of player her opponent
 is. After each round of play, each learns how her opponent has played
 and adapts her subsequent choices to what has been learned. There are
 many ways a player can adapt, depending on such variables as memory,
 pattern-recognition capability, and the ability to take into account the
 effects of her own adjustments upon her opponent's play.
 Let us start by considering the simplest possible case of adaptation:
 the players are "limited strategists," in that they simply adapt their choice
 to the action taken by the opponent on the preceding play. Such agents
 will not try to identify complex patterns of play nor will they change
 their strategy in response to another player's moves.
 Each player will start by cooperating/defecting and will subsequently
 respond with cooperation/defection to the action taken by the opponent.
 There are eight possible adaptive rules the players may choose:
 Subsequent plays
 If other did If other did
 Rule First play C D
 1. C C C
 2. C C D
 3. C D C
 4. C D D
 5. D C C
 6. D C D
 7. D D C
 8. D D D
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 Rule 1 is 'unconditional cooperation'; rule 2 is 'tit for tat'. Rules 3,
 4, 5, and 7 make little sense, as they do not clearly indicate either good
 will or an exploitative attitude; rather, 4 and 5 seem to indicate a con-
 tradictory attitude, whereas 3 and 7 just tell a player to do the contrary
 of what the other did before. Rule 6 would be adopted by a cautious
 player, ready to respond cooperatively to a cooperative opponent but
 unwilling to be exploited even once by a defector; rule 8 is 'unconditional
 defection', which may be adopted by an overly pessimistic player. We
 suppose the players' choice of a rule to mirror their psychological pro-
 pensities, and since we assume the players to be adaptive in a very limited
 way, we do not expect them to change their strategy in the course of
 play, since this option would entail far greater learning capabilities on
 their part. Rules 3, 4, 5, and 7 can be eliminated, since they present
 combinations of initial moves and adaptive responses that make no sense,
 and in such a limited adaptive situation they cannot be perceived as
 "signaling" some complex pattern of play. The players are left with rules
 1, 2, 6, and 8 to choose from.'0
 Now suppose that the players are playing 100 repetitions of the
 following Prisoner's Dilemma game:
 Game 3
 B
 C D
 C 3,3 0,5
 A
 D 5,0 1, 1
 Since the players have four possible patterns of play to choose from,
 they face the following four-by-four game, in which each of the four
 rules is a strategy that will be played in the 100 repetitions of the above
 Prisoner's Dilemma, and the payoffs are the undiscounted sum of the
 payoffs each player obtains in each repetition of the game:
 B
 1 2 6 8
 1 300, 300 300, 300 297, 302 0, 500
 A 2 300, 300 300, 300 250, 250 99, 104
 6 302, 297 250, 250 100, 100 100, 100
 8 500, 0 104, 99 100, 100 100, 100
 This supergame has two equilibria: either both players play a tit-
 for-tat strategy (rule 2) or they both always defect (rule 8). Note that
 10. Brian Skyrms has discussed these rules that he calls "Markov habits" in the context
 of dynamic deliberation on the part of Bayesian players. If Bayesian dynamic deliberators
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 such simple adaptive behavior may not allow one to learn the strategy
 of an opponent; a tit-for-tat player will never learn whether she was
 matched with an unconditional cooperator or a tit-for-tatter, and an
 uncompromising defector will never know whether he was matched with
 a cautious cooperative type. Even if learning were to occur, it would not
 be exploited to the advantage of the players: a prudent cooperator adopting
 rule 8 will immediately learn whether her opponent is an unconditional
 cooperator but will not exploit this knowledge to her advantage, while
 a prudent cooperator and a tit-for-tat player will "lock" into a punitive
 pattern, even if, by being lenient just once, either one could induce a
 dramatic improvement in the overall outcome.
 Consider what a player would choose, knowing that she can only
 marginally adapt. If the opponent is a conditional cooperator, it is better
 to cooperate, while a tit-for-tat strategy does little harm to a player in
 case her opponent is the "always defect" type. If matched to a prudent
 cooperator, it would be better to be unconditionally cooperative, but
 unconditional cooperation is too risky a prospect, while tit for tat still
 does better than the remaining rules. Note that tit for tat is a better
 prospect even if the opponent is "smarter" than the player. Tit for tat
 will protect the player from exploitation by someone endowed with greater
 learning capabilities, since his defection will be immediately punished.
 Hence we would expect adaptive players to choose rule 2 and settle on
 the 2, 2 equilibrium.
 This result, however, crucially depends on the payoffs associated
 with the outcomes. Consider the following Prisoner's Dilemma matrix,
 where the letters represent the payoffs obtained by the row player for
 each combination of his and the opponent's strategies:
 C D
 C a b
 D c d
 Since it is a Prisoner's Dilemma, c > a > d > b. For n plays of the
 game, dn is what a defector will score if matched with another defector,
 while a tit-for-tat player matched with a defector gets dn - 1 + b. If
 dn - (dn - 1 + b) is small, a player will be willing to cooperate, but as
 dn - 1 + b decreases, the probability of choosing defection increases. If
 unilateral cooperation were associated with a large loss, the 8, 8 outcome
 would be more likely to obtain. Note that a player need not assign a high
 probability to being matched with a cooperator in order to choose a tit-
 for-tat strategy. In fact, in 100 repetitions of game 3, it is sufficient to
 assign probability 0.047 to the other player's being a tit-for-tatter in order
 have adequate common knowledge for deliberation, the greater the number of iterations,
 the greater the degree of mutual distrust needed to justify the selection of the 'always
 defect' rule. See B. Skyrms, "Deliberational Dynamics" (1989, typescript), chap. 6.
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 to choose that strategy. However, the greater the loss associated with
 unilateral cooperation, the higher the probability of being matched with
 a cooperator must be in order to make one choose to be a conditional
 cooperator. 1 1
 Suppose now that the rewards associated with joint cooperation and
 the punishments associated with joint defection are large enough to
 justify a cooperative choice in a two-player repeated game, but that the
 game being played is an n-person Prisoner's Dilemma. If n is large enough
 to guarantee a player's anonymity, the incentives change and universal
 defection is to be expected. If, instead, the number of players is such
 that one's defection can be easily detected and punished, the cooperative
 equilibrium remains a possibility. The choice to be a conditional cooperator
 will still depend upon whether unilateral cooperation is not too costly,
 and if the payoff structure is favorable enough, individual cooperation
 can be expected to continue as long as the group's past aggregate behavior
 is cooperative. A behavioral regularity thus established can be highly
 unstable, though; it will be very sensitive to variations in the payoff
 structure. For example, since the players' adaptive rule only considers
 what happened in the previous play, the fact that everyone has "conformed"
 to a cooperative pattern for a long time has no effect upon the choice
 of a rule the next time a Prisoner's Dilemma situation occurs; with a
 payoff structure unfavorable to cooperation, an individual would choose
 to defect. This conclusion is in line with what has been observed by other
 writers in the field. Russell Hardin, for example, has pointed out that
 often a cooperative outcome in the context of a repeated Prisoner's
 Dilemma is due to the existence of "extraplay" incentives that influence
 current choices. Such incentives, however, require a certain degree of
 sophistication on the part of the players.'2 An example of an extraplay
 incentive is the prospect of future activities involving the same participants,
 or different ones that will be informed about the past behavior of the
 players. Under these circumstances, it will be in the individual's interest
 to create a reputation for being a trustworthy, cooperative type. But
 reputation effects require that a player perceives his and others' choices
 as contingent and is able to evaluate the future consequences of present
 behavior.
 What we need is a more complex adaptive dynamics, in which strategic
 uncertainty and the acknowledgment of the possible effects of one's
 adjustments on other players' adjustments play a greater role. Consider
 again two rational players engaged in a Prisoner's Dilemma with a known
 number of repetitions who do not have any information about each
 11. This probability will remain quite small, though. For example, if the payoffs of
 game 3 are slightly modified so that the loss associated with unconditional cooperation is
 -5, the probability of being matched with a tit-for-tatter must be at least 0.069 for a player
 to choose to play tit for tat in 100 repetitions of that game.
 12. R. Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), p.
 164.
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 other's type. The players may use introspective analysis to form their
 prior probabilities about the other's type and in subsequent play try to
 put those different hypotheses to test.
 For example, the players may start by cooperating and see what
 happens. After a few repetitions, each will have formed some hypothesis
 about her opponent's strategy and will adjust her strategy accordingly.
 In a simple, two-person interaction, it is likely that a player will take into
 account the effects of her own adjustments upon her opponent's play,
 whereas in a large population, one will take the current state of the rest
 of the population as a prediction of its state at the next stage, since the
 effects of one's adjustments on other people's future adjustments are
 insignificantly small.
 In order to eliminate some hypotheses, the players may "experiment"
 with small deviations, which may or may not be profitable in terms of
 payoffs.13 Consider, for example, the case in which both players cooperate
 for n repetitions. Then a player may want to "test" the hypothesis that
 her opponent is a retaliator by defecting in the next round. Her deviation
 reveals to the other player that she is not an unconditional cooperator,
 but it might also be taken as a signal that she is unwilling to cooperate
 from now on, if the number of repetitions is small and the end is not
 too far away. Testing a hypothesis involves deviating from one's strategy,
 but it involves the risk of being misperceived by another player as being
 part of a different strategy. Taking this possibility into account, a rational
 player will be more likely to experiment at the beginning of the game,
 in order to restrict the set of possible conjectures about her opponent's
 type without "confusing" him too much.
 Thus a tit-for-tat player may want to ascertain that he is not playing
 with an unconditional cooperator, and a defector may want to test the
 willingness of his opponent to "forgive" as well as the severity of his
 retaliation policy. A prudent cooperator may want to learn if she is
 playing with another prudent cooperator instead of a defector, whereas
 an individual that believes he "deserves more" and thus plans to defect,
 say, twice every three plays, will want to know whether he is playing with
 a similarly convinced player or with a tit-for-tat retaliator. In the latter
 case, the two patterns of play may look identical:
 Player 1: C D D C D D C D D C D D ...
 Player 2: D D C D D C D D C D D C ...
 Player 1 may be a tit-for-tat player, but he may also be a conditional
 cooperator that, like player 2, believes he is more deserving than his
 opponent. If player 2 initially defects, it will be impossible for him to
 know whether or not player l's pattern of play is independent of his
 choices. A better strategy for player 2 would be to cooperate initially,
 13. See D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps, "A Theory of Learning, Experimentation, and
 Equilibrium in Games" (1988, typescript).
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 since by the fifth play he will know whether he is playing against a
 retaliator, in which case he would do better by modifying his strategy
 and choosing to cooperate until the penultimate play. To see why it is
 so, consider the following pattern of play of player 2 (who believes he
 deserves more) against a tit-for-tat player:
 Player 2: C D D C D D ...
 Player 1: C C D D C D ...
 The first three moves of player 1 may suggest a pattern of limited
 cooperation that tells a player to defect once every three plays, and the
 fourth move may or may not indicate retaliation, but by the fifth move
 player 2 will come to see that player 1's next move is always identical to
 his own previous move, signaling a retaliator that is quick to "forgive"
 defection and reward cooperation. Note that "tougher" retaliatory strategies
 will not do as well as tit for tat. For example, a tougher retaliator may
 delay rewarding the opponent for cooperative behavior if there has been
 a previous defection by restoring cooperation only after the opponent
 has unsuccessfully cooperated once. The pattern of play may look like
 this:
 Player 1: C D D D D D C ...
 Player 2: D D C D D C ...
 Suppose player 2 is an exploitative type who would always defect in
 the presence of unconditional cooperators unless she is convinced that
 she is playing with a conditional cooperator who will punish her defection
 and reward her cooperation, in which case she would maximize her
 expected utility by cooperating. Since player 1 chooses to cooperate in
 the first play, and defect in the second, player 2 suspects he is a tit-for-
 tat player; in order to test her hypothesis, player 2 will deviate from her
 strategy in the third play, since a tit-for-tat player will respond positively
 to her signal in the next play. If player 1 keeps defecting, player 2 will
 know for sure that he is not a tit-for-tat player, but the set of possible
 strategies he may be playing is still very large. Player 1 may be a conditional
 cooperator who punishes defection by defecting forever after; he may
 be willing to signal a cooperative attitude at fixed intervals; he may be
 a defector who made a mistake in his first move; he may be a "tough"
 retaliator who will exploit twice or more in return for each exploitative
 episode he had to suffer; and so on. Depending on the projected costs
 of undergoing further testing, which will depend both on the assessed
 probabilities of each hypothesis and the magnitude of the loss associated
 with unreciprocated cooperation, player 2 may or may not attempt further
 testing. This example suggests that a "tough" retaliator risks locking
 himself in a self-defeating pattern, since punishment, to be effective,
 must be easy to understand.14
 14. I suspect that, whenever an unfair pattern of cooperation emerges, this is more
 likely to be due to an underlying bargaining game in which one of the parties has greater
 bargaining power rather than to be the outcome of poor learning.
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 Prudent cooperation is a difficult strategy to detect, too, since the
 prudent cooperator will initiate the game by defecting and will subsequently
 cooperate in response to a cooperative move of his opponent. When two
 prudent cooperators are matched, their strategies will be indistinguishable
 from an 'always defect' strategy, and they will keep defecting unless one
 of them is willing to risk being twice "exploited" in order to test the
 hypothesis that the opponent is not a defector.
 In general, tit for tat has a big advantage over other strategies: it is
 easy to learn, since it has a clearly recognizable pattern, and it protects
 the player who adopts it from excessive exploitation by a defector; tit
 for tat will at best tie, and at worst it will lose no more than one play.
 Robert Axelrod believes that these features of tit for tat are responsible
 for its overwhelming success in the computer tournaments he ran.15
 When different strategies were paired off for round-robin tournaments
 of an iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, Axelrod found out that-if the prob-
 ability of the game's continuing is sufficiently great-tit for tat scored
 better than all the other strategies it competed with. What I am suggesting
 here is that the very characteristics that make tit for tat successful in
 computer tournaments are also likely to play an important role in all
 those Prisoner's-Dilemma-like circumstances in which there is repeated
 interaction but the player is uncertain as to his opponent's character.
 Especially when the number of repetitions is small and experimenting
 more costly, tit for tat seems likely to be chosen by a player who wants
 to signal unambiguously his intentions and benefit from the possibility
 of joint cooperation.
 FROM TWO TO MANY
 Once a cooperative equilibrium is established, we may expect it to persist,
 since data from past experience can be used to predict how an opponent
 will act in the future. If we learn that we are playing with a tit-for-tat
 opponent, we recognize that unilateral defection is going to be punished
 immediately. Under these circumstances, each player will prefer to co-
 operate if the other cooperates, and each will attach high probability to
 the opponent playing his part in the equilibrium; hence, each player will
 have a decisive reason to stick to cooperative behavior. Note that common
 knowledge has not been assumed nor is it needed to maintain conformity.
 Since the players will have probabilistic beliefs "close" to the equilibrium
 but not full knowledge, beliefs will be quasi-consistent, but not necessarily
 fully consistent, with each other. However, once players' expectations
 are close to the cooperative equilibrium, they will tend to persist because
 of reinforcing feedback: each player will play her part in the equilibrium,
 which will lead the other to expect with greater certainty that the equilibrium
 accurately predicts what the opponent will do in the future.
 Such a stable equilibrium is a norm of cooperation, since it fulfills
 the conditions that define a social norm as a function of the preferences
 15. See R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic, 1984), p. 53.
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 and beliefs of the members of the population in which that behavioral
 regularity exists. It is easy to see how approval and disapproval play only
 a secondary role in eliciting conformity. If another player defects, one
 is made worse off in two respects: there is an immediate loss and one is
 forced to punish the defector in the next round. The obvious disapproval
 that accompanies defection reinforces a cooperative attitude; it cannot,
 however, substitute for conditional preferences and beliefs in eliciting
 cooperation.
 We may expect a norm of cooperation to emerge as a stationary
 equilibrium in a group of players in which the identities of the players
 and the experiences they have had with each other matter. Once a norm
 of cooperation has been established in a dyadic interaction, it will tend
 to persist and elicit conformity in new situations in which both cooperative
 and competitive strategies are possible. If the subjects involved are the
 same, or if they carry with them reputations from past play, mutual
 expectations are likely to be quasi-consistent, since each individual will
 tend to believe that what has happened in the past is a good predictor
 of what will happen in the future.
 The larger the population becomes, however, the more individuals
 will tend to ignore the effects of their adjustments on the future course
 of play of other individuals, as their identity (and reputation) will matter
 less and less. In fact, I doubt that learning is possible in large, anonymous
 groups. In large groups, an individual's choice has an insignificant impact
 on the collective outcome, and defection is likely to go undetected. In
 those circumstances, experimenting with small deviations from one's
 strategy makes no sense, since no response is likely to follow. The only
 data available to predict the future state of the population is its past and
 current aggregate behavior, so if cooperation has taken place in the past,
 individuals will tend to expect it to occur in the future, too. In these
 circumstances, expectations of cooperative behavior will be self-defeating
 and expectations of defecting behavior self-fulfilling.
 If people can learn to cooperate only in dyadic or small-group in-
 teractions, the explanation of how norms of cooperation emerge as equi-
 librium patterns of behavior does not extend to large, anonymous groups,
 where the presence of conforming behavior might be rather explained
 by the diffusion of small-group norms through an evolutionary process.
 Russell Hardin has pointed to the overlapping nature of group activities
 and the tendency to generalize to similar cases as possible mechanisms
 through which conventions involving large populations are built up out
 of dyadic interactions.16 Examples are the norms of truth telling and
 promise keeping. One will presumably learn that it is better to be sincere
 and trustworthy in the context of repeated interactions with the same
 small group of people and will later adopt the same behavior in situations
 that are sufficiently similar to the original ones or that involve reputation
 16. Ibid., p. 196.
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 effects, in that violation of the norm is taken to signal a flawed character,
 and this in turn will jeopardize future interactions. Another striking
 example of widespread cooperative behavior is the development of the
 "honor code" that governed international commerce in the thirteen century.
 It was common for merchants to buy on credit and clear their debts at
 some future time; all the seller got was a "bill of exchange," a written
 promise to pay a sum of money at some future date. Henry Pirenne
 noted that, since metallic money was scarce, the massive development of
 commerce was made possible by the practice of credit, which involved
 the use of bills of exchange as money.'7 It was not the enforcement of
 a government but rather the trustworthiness of the issuer that backed a
 bill of exchange and made it usable as a means of payment. All this would
 have been infeasible had the merchants not been in continual relations
 of debt and credit with one another and thus concerned with good standing
 among their peers. One can imagine the original development of norms
 of business conduct among a few local merchants, their spread to a larger
 business community through the repeated contacts with foreign merchants
 provided by international fairs, and finally the emergence of a general,
 unspoken code of behavior regulating the activities of an international
 community of merchants and bankers.
 An evolutionary model of the spread of a behavioral pattern over
 an entire population is not in conflict with an explanation of its emergence
 in terms of individual learning in repeated small-group interactions.
 Voting, contributing to public charities, and refraining from littering or
 polluting are choices that are not easily amenable to a rational explanation.
 They need not be, however, thought of as counterexamples to rational
 choice theory. They may result from compliance with norms of cooperation
 that emerged out of rational behavior in other contexts and were sub-
 sequently extended to the entire population through selection pressures.
 The advantages of supplementing a rational choice explanation with an
 evolutionary approach are twofold. On the one hand, an evolutionary
 model does not require sophisticated reasoning and learning in circum-
 stances, such as large-group interactions, in which it would be unrealistic
 to assume them. We may, rather, suppose that some behavioral patterns
 borne out of strategic interactions spread and evolve in a large population
 out of simple adaptive mechanisms. It is not too farfetched to assume
 that strategies that make a person do better than others will be retained,
 while strategies that lead to failure will be abandoned. Another plausible
 mechanism is imitation: those who do best are observed by others who
 subsequently emulate their behavior.
 Whether a behavioral pattern that has emerged in a small group
 will survive in a larger population is an important question to address,
 and an evolutionary model provides a description of the conditions under
 17. H. Pirenne, Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe (New, York: Routledge
 & Kegan Paul, 1936).
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 which social norms may spread. One may think of several environments
 to start with. A population can be represented as entirely homogeneous,
 in the sense that everybody is adopting the same type of behavior, or
 heterogeneous to various degrees. In the former case, it is important to
 know whether the commonly adopted behavior is stable against mutations.
 For example, experiments conducted by Axelrod and Maynard Smith
 and Price show that tit for tat is an evolutionarily stable strategy, which
 means that a population of individuals that adopt it cannot be successfully
 invaded by isolated mutants, since the mutants will be at a disadvantage
 with respect to reproductive success.18 It is also well known that a population
 of defectors cannot be invaded by isolated cooperators. A more interesting
 case, and one relevant to a study of the reproduction of norms of co-
 operation, is that of a population in which several competing strategies
 are present at any given time. What we want to know is whether the
 present strategy frequencies are stable or if there is a tendency for one
 strategy to become dominant over time.
 What follows is a simple example of an evolutionary process. A game
 is repeated n times, and after each round of the game, the actual payoffs
 and strategies of the players become public knowledge; on the basis of
 this information, each player is allowed to adjust his strategy for the next
 round. More formally, let pit be the frequency of strategy i in population
 P at time t, and let Hij be the payoff to adopting strategy i if the opponent
 plays strategy. Let Hit = Ij Hijpit be the total payoff of playing i at time
 t, which may also be interpreted as i's fitness at time t. Note that the total
 payoff is the weighted sum of the different payoffs one obtains by being
 matched with different types of strategies, where the weights represent
 the frequencies of those strategies in the entire population at time t. pit+ 1
 (Pit, P2t, . . .) represents the frequency of strategy i at time t + 1 as a
 function of the relative frequencies at time t of all the available strategies
 (including i), and thus depends on the total payoff of playing strategy i
 at time t, since it is the payoff one obtains by playing a given strategy
 that determines whether one is going to play it again or to abandon it.
 The dynamics of the frequency distributions of the strategies can be
 represented as follows:
 f (Hzt)Pit
 Pit+i = f(.)p.' (1)
 wheref (fit) is the reproduction rate of strategy i and is a monotonically
 increasing function of the total payoff of playing strategy i at time t.
 An equilibrium is a frequency vector (Pi, P2,. . .) that reproduces
 itself over time. A pure strategy equilibrium is one in which only one
 18. See, e.g., J. Maynard Smith and G. Price, "The Logic of Animal Conflict," Nature
 246 (1973): 15-18.
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 strategy is played by the entire population, that is, it is a vector where
 pn = 1, and pi = 0 for all i =# n. Of course, any such vector reproduces
 itself, but what we want to know is whether it is stable against mutations.
 Given two strategies i and n, the frequency of i over time will decrease
 if the reproduction rate of strategy n matched with n is greater than that
 of strategy i matched with n, that is, pit > pit+, in each period as long as
 the ratio f1Min < I for each i #& n.
 Given a fixed population, the number of mutants rises whenever
 the fitness associated with the mutant strategy is higher. Following Maynard
 Smith, the condition that makes an equilibrium stable over mutations is
 that, for each i #& n, Hin < flen 19
 Consider the simple case in which there are only two possible strategies:
 tit for tat (T) and defect (D). This simplification helps in understanding
 the dynamic process that becomes much more complex with a higher
 number of strategies but does not affect the generality of the analysis.
 Let p = frequency of strategy T and 1 -p = frequency of strategy D.
 We may rewrite equation (1) as
 Pt+i f (Tt)Pt
 f (Tt)Pt + f (Dt)(I - Pt)
 f [PtHTT + (1 Pt)rHTD]Pt
 f [P tHTT + (1 - Pt)HTD]Pt + f [P tHDT + (1 - P6HDD]( - Ptt)
 We want to find the solution p to the above equation in the nontrivial
 case in which A is different from 0 and 1. That is, we look for a value of
 p such that-if the frequency of tit-for-tatters in the population is equal
 to or greater than it-the dynamics will favor tit-for-tatters, and, at that
 value, the number of conditional cooperators will be stable. Substituting
 b in the above equation, we obtain
 [P 11+ (1 p-)TD] = f[pHTT + (1 P- TD p
 + f[pHDT + (1 - p)DD](1 -p
 and, solving for p, we get
 AIDD - 11TD
 = 1ITT + 11DD - 11DT - 11TD
 Suppose there have been n repetitions of game 3. The payoffs obtained
 by playing T or D against an opponent who plays, respectively, T or D
 19. J. Maynard Smith, Evolution and the Theory of Games (Cambridge: Cambridge University
 Press, 1982).
 860 Ethics July 1990
 P
 t+1
 0~~~~
 0 ~~~~P
 t
 FIG. 1
 are the following: rIDD = n; r1TT = 2n; r1TD = n - 1; r1DT = n + 4. In
 this case, assuming that n is at least 4, the minimum value at which a
 group of tit-for-tatters can survive in a population of defectors is
 A p n - (n - 1) 1
 2n + n - (n + 4) - (n - 1) n - 3
 If n is greater than 4, this is a fraction less than 1. For values greater
 thank, tit for tat will notjust survive but thrive, as more and more players
 0 1
 P 1
 FIG. 2
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 will see the advantage of adopting it. However, if the frequency of tit-
 for-tatters is lower than p, cooperative behavior will get less and less
 frequent in each period and will eventually disappear (see fig. 1). On
 the other hand, if n is less than 4, no matter how many tit-for-tat mutants
 enter a population of defectors at once, their frequency will decrease in
 each period and eventually go to zero (see fig. 2).
 This simple example illustrates the general point that norms of
 cooperation that emerged in a small group may extend to a population
 through an evolutionary process; if the number of repetitions is sufficiently
 large, a small proportion of cooperators can take over an entire population.
 CONCLUSION
 The above scenario encompasses several ideas that have so far been kept
 apart. The emergence of norms is an example of spontaneous order, a
 form of coordination that takes place without the intervention of a central
 authority and does not presuppose previous agreements or common
 knowledge among the parties. Yet social norms embody some form of
 rationality and are ultimately reducible to individual preferences and
 beliefs. The traditional game-theoretic account has the merit of emphasizing
 the interdependent nature of the preferences and expectations that sustain
 social norms, but does not explain how expectations are formed. What
 is presented here is a plausible reconstruction of how norms of cooperation
 can emerge through learning in small-group, repeated interactions and
 be subsequently adopted by larger groups of people. In this sense, evo-
 lutionary and rational choice explanations complement each other.
